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CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, PUBLIC
FINANCE, AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
MULTILATERAL FINANCING INSTITUTIONS: WHAT
FORM OF ACCOUNTABILITY?
Jerome Levinson*
In August of 1982, Mexico defaulted on the payment of its debt ser-
vice obligations.' This default caused a debt crisis which involved most
international banks.2 As a result of this crisis, the private commercial
banks are unlikely to be a significant source of new net financing for
development purposes.
The basic business of Multilateral Financing Agencies (MFAs) is to
lend money for specific projects and programs 3 to borrowing member
countries which will, in turn, stimulate higher economic growth rates.'
As part of the conditions for such lending, the MFAs increasingly re-
quire that the institutions (and their governments) which borrow the
money implement economic reforms.5 Thus, the multilateral lending in-
* Mr. Levinson is a Washington attorney. He was General Counsel to the Inter-
American Development Bank (1977-89), and Counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations (1972-1977).
1. See Robert L. Morgan, et al., Legal Issues Arising from the Mexican Economic
Crisis, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 367, 385 (1984) (illustrating the factors which
contributed to the Mexican debt crisis) [hereinafter Mexican Crisis]; see also Alberto
Gonzales Santos, Beyond Baker and Brady: Deeper Debt Reduction for Latin Ameri-
can Sovereign Debtors, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 66 (1991) (stating that of the US 500
billion dollars owed by sovereign states, US 442.4 billion dollars was from Latin Amer-
ican countries).
2. See Mexican Crisis, supra note 1, at 385 (portraying the effects the Mexican
debt crisis had on lending institutions).
3. See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment, Dec. 27, 1944, art. III, §4(vii), 60 Stat. 1440, 1452, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, 164-
66 [hereinafter IBRD Agreement] (stating that, "[l]oans made... by the bank,
shall... be for the purpose of specific projects . . . ").
4. W.C. Baum, The Project Cycle, in INTERNATIONAL BORROWING (D.D. Bradlow
ed., 1986).
5. See I.F. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 25-31 (1991)
[hereinafter SHIHATA, CHANGING WORLD] (describing how the lending institutions at-
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
stitutions are not only concerned with assuring repayment of the loans;
they are also concerned with how a particular loan impacts the coun-
try's economy and the government's implementations of economic
policies.6
Increasingly, the issues which have evolved are: (a) to whom are
these institutions accountable; (b) who defines the "conditionality"
which attaches to the lending; and, (c) who defines the process by
which the conditions are negotiated. Latin America illustrates the na-
ture of these issues.
I. THE TRADITIONAL DIVIDE
Traditionally, the great philosophical divide in Latin America, and
the cause of friction between the Latin American countries and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund) and the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank),
was over the basic development strategy of the borrowing member
countries.7 Since the end of World War II, the Latin American coun-
tries generally adopted a strategy of economic growth based upon: im-
port substitution; a large role for the state in public sector financing,
particularly industrial development; and, the use of subsidies to favor
particular sectors believed to warrant priority financing.8 In the three
decades encompassing the 1950s through the 1970s, this model suc-
ceeded in creating a sizeable middle class and a strong indigenous in-
dustrial sector, particularly in Brazil and Mexico." This plan turned out
to be more internationally competitive than anyone had thought
possible.
This strategy, however, also had fundamental defects. First, it failed
to secure a reliable domestic revenue base. Second, it relied increas-
ingly upon capital intensive infrastructure financed by borrowing from
tempt to strengthen the overall economy of the borrowing countries by encouraging
economic and bureaucratic reform).
6. Id.
7. See Letter from Gustavo Petricoli, Mexican Minister of Finance, to Jacques de
Larosiere, Managing Director of IMF (July 22, 1986) in Recent Developments 28
HARV. INT'L L.J. 107, 157 (1987) (describing the past tensions between the IMF and
Mexico).
8. See generally, LATIN AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS: ADJUSTING TO THE PAST OR
PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE (Robert Pastor ed., 1987) (providing a brief history of the
Latin American debt since the beginning of the nineteenth century).
9. See Comment, Ursula Wassermann, Latin American Debt Crisis, 18 J. OF
WORLD TRADE L. 342 (1982) (describing the strong economic development in Latin
American countries during this period); see also SHIHATA, CHANGING WORLD, supra
note 5, at 15 (illustrating the increase in global Gross Domestic Product by all develop-
ing countries as a result of the loans and programs of the IMF).
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internal and external sources.10 Third, it also failed to effectively ad-
dress the social imbalance within each society. Such imbalances were
caused by: rural and tenure systems which concentrated ownership in a
very small portion of the rural population; education systems which
siphoned out many children of the poor at the secondary level and
failed to enroll them in the primary system; and health delivery systems
which failed to reach great majorities of the population." The end re-
sult was internal migration of landless laborers to large metropolitan
centers, overburdening social services, or, as in the case of Brazil, mi-
grating to frontier areas with devastating effects on the environment.1
2
The great borrowing binge of the 1970s revealed the defects inherent in
this model of development.
During the 1980s two fundamental changes occurred. First, demo-
cratically elected governments became the rule in Latin America.1
3
Second, a "silent revolution" in thinking occurred within a broad range
of Latin American societies. This revolution accentuated the need for
fundamental change in the existing economic model, requiring: a di-
minished role of the state in direct production of goods and services,
and less reliance on subsidies and more on market forces, as well as a
need for integration into the world economy.' The details and empha-
sis in individual countries varied, however, in general, the great philo-
sophical divide which had separated the Latin American leadership
from that of the World Bank and IMF closed.
An agreement with the IMF (and World Bank) is a precondition not
only for a lending program with the multilateral lending institutions,
10. See Mexican Crisis, supra note 1, at 385-86 (describing the surge in Mexican
borrowing during the 1970s).
11. See, e.g., The Political Economy of Democratization, 15/2 THE WASHINGTON
QUARTERLY 187 (Spring 1992) (describing the inadequacy of the provision of basic
services to a broad sector of the Mexican population).
12. See Giaimo, Deforestation in Brazil: Domestic Political Imperative-Global
Environmental Disaster, 18 ENvTL. L. 537, 540 (1990) (explaining the factors which
contributed to the massive migration of Brazilians to the Amazon regions).
13. See Irwin P. Stotzky, The Fragile Bloom of Democracy, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV.
105 (1989) (describing the major issues raised by the Latin American transition to
democracy); see also Carlos Santiago Nino, Transition to Democracy. Corporation
and Constitutional Reform in Latin America, 44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 129 (1989) (illus-
trating the basic problems surrounding the emergence of Latin American democracies).
14. See Kim Reisman, The World Bank and the IMF: At the Forefront of World
Transformation, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 349, 377 (1992) (portraying the success of the
Mexican efforts at privatization and internationalization of the economy); see also
SHIHATA, CHANGING WORLD, supra note 5, at 30 (stating that many developing coun-
tries have been expanding the role of the private sector and of market forces in an
effort to diminish their foreign debt).
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but also for a debt restructuring agreement with commercial banks.',
In the first instance, the international financial community's definition
of priorities is communicated to the borrowing country through the
IMF. The following discussion analyzes these priorities.
II. COUNTRY PERFORMANCE
The most important factor considered by multilateral lending institu-
tions is macroeconomic reform including fiscal, monetary, and ex-
change-rate policy, as well as a recent emphasis toward market liberali-
zation and privatization. 6 Of secondary importance are social reforms
such as land tenure changes, broadened access to education, health
care and contraception, and political democracy through multiparty
elections absent human rights abuses." For example, international fi-
nancing agencies look favorably toward a country which makes rapid
progress toward market liberalization even though that country abuses
its political democracy and violated human rights. Conversely, these
agencies do not cater to a country with mediocre macroeconomic per-
formance, even though it may be making a serious effort at social re-
form in order to establish a solid base for growth.
Chile is a leading example of this dichotomy. Under the leadership
of former dictator General Augusto Pinochet, Chile was rewarded with
extensive financing from the multilateral financing agencies. 18 Nicara-
gua, in contrast, became an outcast, due partly to the Reagan Adminis-
tration's determination to bring down the Sandinista regime because of
Cuban and Soviet influences. 9
The IMF, World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB) increasingly incorporate short-term social measures into specific
15. See, e.g., Reisman, supra note 14, at 373 (describing how, under President
Bush's Enterprise for the Americas' Initiative, borrowing countries must reach an
agreement with the IMF to participate in debt relief programs).
16. See SHIHATA, CHANGING WORLD, supra note 5, at 30 (listing the policy, regu-
latory and institutional level goals of the World Bank).
17. See SHIHATA, CHANGING WORLD, supra note 5, at 33 (covering World Bank
efforts to alleviate poverty, especially with regard to women); see also Memorandum
from the Vice President and General Counsel of the World Bank, (Dec. 21, 1990)
[hereinafter World Bank Memorandum] (entitled, "Issues of Governance in Borrowing
Members: The Extent of Their Relevance Under the Bank's Articles of Agreement").
18. See Reisman, supra note 14, at 376 (discussing Chile's success at privatization
and trade liberalization since the Pinochet Government took power).
19. See Jerome I. Levinson, End of an Era: The Seamless Web of American For-
eign Policy 29-30 (Oct. 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Author) [here-
inafter End of an Era] (noting the World Bank's consideration of United States inter-




economic plans in order to cushion a country's adjustment. In judging
whether a major international financing program is warranted in a bor-
rowing country, however, these institutions have not explicitly consid-
ered the extent that a country is addressing what Hannah Arendt re-
ferred to as the problem of poverty, understood as the existence of
conditions of dehumanizing misery.20 This condition breeds the passion
of compassion, a sentiment underlying the revolutionary impulse that
predates Marxism. 1
This relatively limited approach to the definition of development re-
flects the fact that the problem of development has historically been
remedied by fostering economic growth. In the decade of the 1960s,
other broader considerations such as social equity and political democ-
racy were factored into the development dialogue.2 2 More recently, en-
vironmental concerns and popular participation have emerged as im-
portant considerations.2 3
Organizationally and conceptually, the United States government
primarily perceives the definition of "country performance" as a finan-
cial and economic matter. Other considerations are decidedly of a sec-
ondary nature, if they enter into the discussion at all. These other con-
siderations may assume more importance if the United States Congress
or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) apply strong political pres-
sure. Such pressure has been particularly effective with respect to envi-
ronmental questions.
III. AN EXAMPLE: MEXICO
To take a contemporary example, the United States government con-
siders Mexico to be outstanding in its "country performance.' Mex-
20. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 54 (1963).
21. Id. at 53-55.
22. See Sisters in the Wood: A Survey of the IMF and the World Bank, THE
ECONOMIST, Oct. 12-18, 1991, at 9 (addressing the World Bank's support of farming,
education, population control and urban development during the 1960s).
23. See SHIHATA, CHANGING WORLD, supra note 5, at 31-33 (explaining the
World Bank's efforts to incorporate environmental issues into the development process);
see also Task Force on Governance for the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development: the Governance Dimension 33 (June 26, 1991) (on file with the Author)
[hereinafter Governance Paper] (recognizing the importance of popular participation in
the successful implementation of economic, environmental and social policy).
24. See FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Third World Debt: Hearing of the Int'l Finance
and Monetary Policy Subcom. of the Senate Banking. Housing and Urban Affairs
Comm. 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1990) (statement of David Mulford, Under Secretary,
U.S. Dept. of Treasury) (explaining Mexico's new economic plan designed to achieve
significant debt reduction, produce economic growth and yield other economic
benefits).
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ico's economic performance has produced impressive results. Between
1982 and 1990, Mexico turned a budget deficit equal to approximately
seven percent (7 %) of its gross domestic product into a surplus equal
to eight percent (8%), and privatized close to seventy-five percent
(75 %) of all government industries.2 5 Today, one and seven-tenths per-
cent (1.7%) of the goods imported into the country require licenses,
down from one-hundred percent (100%) in 1982,6 and the maximum
tariff has been slashed to twenty percent (20 %) from one-hundred per-
cent (100%).27 In 1990, Mexico's real domestic product expanded
more than three percent (3 %) for the second year in a row, and ex-
ports to the United States have risen seventy-two percent (72%) since
1986.28 Inflation dropped from a peak of one-hundred and eighty per-
cent (180%) in 1988 to an estimated annual rate of less than twenty
percent (20%) in 1991.29
Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari has coupled the eco-
nomic performance with an ambitious social infrastructure investment
program termed "Solidarity.""0 Through this program, communities
decide upon the priority of local investment, the government contrib-
utes a part of the investment and local committees oversee the execu-
tion of the construction.3 1 The program has been the fastest growing
part of the budget, albeit from a relatively low base. It has been politi-
cally advantageous for the governing party, the Partido Revolucionario
Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)), but there is no
doubt it likewise contributes to improving services and basic amenities
such as potable water and sewerage facilities in communities lacking
them in the past.
3 2
The key to the economic success is the combination of a wage policy
and a firm grip on the unions. The PRI control over the unions permits
the continuation of a price and wage restraint pact between the party
25. 1990 National Trade Data Bank, MARKET REPORTS, Dec. 1990.
26. Id.
27. Id. See also Country Outlooks - Mexico 1990, BANK OF AM. NT & SA
WORLD INFO. SERV., June 1990 (concluding that reducing tariff requirements encour-
ages foreign investments in Mexico).
28. Id.
29. Linda Robinson & Andrea Dabrowski, The Unfinished Revolution, U.S. NEws
& WORLD REPORT, July 27, 1992, at 45.
30. See Mexico's President Touts Economic Reform, UPI, Nov. 1, 1991 (LEXIS,
Lexis Library, UPI File) (describing Mexico's accumulation of funds to operate this
self-help program).
31. David Clark Scott, Mexico's Public-Works Program Bolsters President As It




and the employees. 33 This is an essential tenet to the economic strat-
egy.34 In practice, what this relatively bland statement means is that
real average wages since 1982 have declined by fifty percent (50%). 31
As a consequence of this wage policy, Mexico's labor force is extremely
competitive in terms of relative wages with Asian countries. 3 In case
there are any doubts concerning the continuation of the wage policy, a
report prepared by the United States Embassy in Mexico City notes
that the Mexican Minister of Labor, Arsenio Farrell Cubillas, main-
tains his opposition to labor, and his efforts to restrain labor's demands
for wage increases.37
In pursuing its objective of privatizing state-owned companies, the
Mexican government uses a variety of strong-arm tactics 38 to overcome
labor's opposition to a change in contractual conditions. A change
which the government considers necessary as a precondition to selling
the enterprises to private interests. The United States Embassy report
cites, for example, the forced bankruptcy of a Cananean company, in-
cluding the use of soldiers to enforce the company's closure, after work-
ers threatened to strike in support of collective bargaining. 39 Similar
pressure tactics were used by the government in the bankruptcy of
Aero Mexico.40
The privatization program moreover also led to a concentration of
economic power in key sectors of the economy. A report by the United
States International Trade Commission (ITC) notes, with respect to
the Mexican privatization program, that most parastatal enterprises be-
came part of large consortia formerly competing with the state in an
33. Robert Graham, Early Success in the Laboratory, FIN. Tibms, Oct. 20, 1989,
at 22.
34. Id.
35. Gregory P. Shaffer, An Alternative to Unilateral Immigration Controls: To-
ward a Coordinated U.S.-Mexico Binational Approach, 41 STAN. L. REV. 187 (1988);
L. Mertens & P.J. Richards, Recession and Employment in Mexico, 126 INT'L LAB.
REV. 229 (1987); G. Bowens, How Do You Compete Wi1th SI-an-Hour Wages? 4 Busi-
NESS WEEK, Mar. 16, 1992, at 103; Sidney Weintraub, Jobs on the Line, BusINEss
MEXICO, Mar. 1991, at 10.
36. Patricia Capdevielle, International Comparisons of Competition Costs, 114
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 34 (Aug. 1991).
37. United States Embassy to Mexico, Mexican Labor Trends: An Annual Report
for Mexico for 1988 to Mid-1990 (1990) (unpublished report, on file with the Author)
[hereinafter Mexican Labor Trends].
38. See id. at 11-13 (describing Mexican government declarations that strikes are
"illegal," dissolution of union leadership, military intervention in areas of labor unrest,
forced bankruptcy proceedings and required revisions of labor contracts according to
government guidelines).
39. Id. at 13.
40. Id. at 13.
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effort to consolidate the market.41 Even supporters of Salinas concede
that the government's privatization program tends to replace state mo-
nopolies with private ones, rather than promote competition.42
In part, the design of the privatization program has been driven by
the need to obtain revenues to cover the fiscal and balance of payments
deficits, and to permit needed investment in. neglected areas of social
infrastructure, such as, education and health. The relative lack of con-
cern with monopolistic and oligopolistic trends in the program is ex-
plained by the anticipated North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) as, the perceived necessity to equip Mexican industry and
finance with the muscle to confront anticipated competition from
American and Canadian multinational companies and banks.43
Moreover, it can be argued that both the import liberalization, and
more open regime governing foreign investment, constitute a break on
whatever abuses may be implied in the greater concentration of eco-
nomic power within the Mexican domestic industry and banking struc-
ture. Given these caveats, however, it still remains true that the coer-
cive Mexican labor relations structure and regressive wage policy,
coupled with the increased concentration of economic power, ought to
raise major issues for discussion, especially since the Mexican "model"
is one which is constantly recommended for countries in Eastern Eu-
rope and Latin America to emulate.""
Unfortunately, such a debate is unlikely to take place within the
MFAs. The economic model which they have endorsed has depended,
to a significant degree, on precisely the type of coercive labor relations
structure and regressive wage policies which underlie the performance
of Mexico.45 These coercive labor relations and structures, and regres-
sive wage policies existed in Chile under the Pinochet regime and under
the military dictatorship in South Korea during the decades of the
1970s and 1980s. And during those decades, Chile and South Korea
were admired within the MFAs for their economic performance.46
41. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and
Prospects for Future United States Mexican Relations, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No.
332-282, Pub. 2275 (Apr. 1990), pp. 3-10.
42. Andrea Dabrowski, Mexico's Privatization Plan Under Pressure, THE WASH.
POST, Sept. 3, 1991, at El.
43. Id.
44. Bill Javetski & Stephen Baker, Can Mexico Embrace the U.S. - at Arm's
Length?, BUSINESS WEEK, May 20, 1991, at 63.
45. Donal McCarthy, Fine Tuning the Options, BUSINESS MExico, June 1990, at
76.
46. See SHIHATA, CHANGING WORLD, supra note 5 (describing the success of
Chile as a country that received high marks for its macroeconomic performance under
the leadership of former dictator General Augusto Pinochet).
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Labor relations structure is rarely addressed within these organiza-
tions. In fact, if it is discussed at all, labor relations structure is usually
presented from the limited viewpoint of how to restrain the "excesses"
of wage and benefit demands of workers, rather than the regressive in-
come distribution implicit in the economic model that constitutes the
economic orthodoxy of the day.
Previously, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America (ECLA) and the regional development bank for the region,
the IDB, constituted a rallying point for addressing questions of devel-
opment strategy.47 Today, however, that kind of debate could not take
place because the IDB and ECLA share the same orthodoxy currently
prevailing in the MFAs.
This does not mean that orthodox economic policy prescriptions are
always wrong, or that the MFAs are "imposing" their own policy pre-
scriptions upon the defenseless countries. Instead, the result is a stifling
monolithic orthodoxy that bars skeptical questioning of country per-
formance that otherwise would raise issues about the Mexican experi-
ence and its applicability in other circumstances. In commenting on
Latin America, Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the IMF,
observed that a "Silent Revolution" has taken place that largely closed
the policy gap with the MFAs. 8
It is obvious upon examination of the conditionality that attaches to
the agricultural sector loans of the MFAs, that they rarely touch upon
questions of land tenure ownership. Rather, they concentrate on com-
mitments to reduce subsidies and interest rates for credit above the rate
of inflation (real rates), and other efficiency factors."' Recent scholar-
ship, however, gives great weight to the implementation of effective
47. See End of an Era, supra note 19, at 3-8 (stating that the IDB was created as
an instrument for financing industrial development in Latin America and as a reaction
to the orthodox economic policy of the World Bank and the IMF). For example, within
the IDB a lively debate took place over strategy towards Peru during the administra-
tion of the APRA government of Alan Garcia. Id. Questions debated included: Was it
wise, right or just, to cut off all financing when the macroeconomic performance is
poor? Is there a case to be made for selective financing for basic services such as pota-
ble water and sewerage services? Is it fair to other borrowing countries who have taken
tough decisions with respect to budget deficits and monetary policy? If such facilities
had continued to be financed, would Peru have had the cholera epidemic that it did, or
would it have been as severe? Id.
48. See NAFTA Will Not Keep Mexico From Pursuing Other Commercial Ties.
IMF Director Says, Notimex Mexican News Service, Mar. 6, 1992 (LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Current File) (discussing positive steps taken by Latin America toward trade
relations with Europe and Japan).
49. See End of an Era, supra note 19, at 7 (noting that the IDB imposed conditions
upon its loans in areas that directly impacted upon the "financial viability of the bor-
rowing enterprises").
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agrarian reform programs in Asian countries, such as, South Korea and
Taiwan in accounting for their economic performance.5"
It is no surprise then, that the most serious challenge to the existing
orthodoxy is coming from the United Nations Economic Commission
for Africa (UNECA) and not from within the MFAs themselves or
from within the regional organizations for Latin America."' UNECA
questioned whether the structural adjustment programs of the World
Bank were in the best interests of the African nations. 52 The gravamen
of the complaint was that the investment needs of the African countries
were sacrificed to the short-term adjustment programs promoted by the
World Bank and the IMF.
53
Due to the sacrifice of education, health, and infrastructure financing
to achieve fiscal objectives, the African countries fell further behind in
human resource development. The result of the lag in human resource
development is ultimately determining whether the African nations can
compete in the modern international economy.5 ' The debate surround-
ing the United Nations Report afforded the borrowing member coun-
tries of the World Bank a rare opportunity to hold an MFA accounta-
ble for its strategic conception of "country performance." 5
IV. SECTOR LENDING AND SECTOR STRUCTURAL
ADJUSTMENT
The traditional form of lending in the MFAs was project lending
related to the execution of specific work, or programs that could be
50. See William C. Thiesenhusen, Phillipine Land Reform Stymied, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 25, 1990, at 18 (discussing South Korea and Taiwan as cele-
brated newly industrialized countries due to effective land reforms),
51. See World Bank, IMF Economic Reform Policies for Africa Fail, Says
Adedji, Xinhua General News Service, April 22, 1992 (LEXIS, Nexis Library, Cur-
rent File) (stating that the economic policies of the World Bank and the IMF for
Africa have failed because they are inappropriate).
52. See id. (asserting the inappropriateness of World Bank policies in Africa); see
also African Economies on Shaky Foundation, Inter Press Service, April 22, 1992
(LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File) (elaborating on the unsuitability of the struc-
tural adjustment programs of the World Bank and the IMF).
53. See Roundup: Africa Seeks Cure for Spiritless Economy, Xinhua General
News Service, June 24, 1992 (LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File) (criticizing west-
ern-prescribed remedies of the IMF and World Bank as unsuitable for African coun-
tries as such policies over-emphasize short-term balancing of external and internal fi-
nances at the expense of longer term development).
54. See id. (stating that the economic positions of the IMF and the World Bank
adversely affect health, education, and social services of the average people in Africa).
55. See id. (asserting that opponents of the structural adjustment programs of the
IMF and World Bank believe that the most egregious mistake of the programs was
ignoring Africa's unique situation).
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identified with respect to how loan funds were used."" Such projects
included the building of roads, power projects, and the construction of
schools and hospitals. Often, the MFAs combined commitments for ad-
ministrative reforms of the enterprise executing the project or program,
or reform of such project or program, with the loan. 7 One example of
an administrative reform was a tariff structure which governed the rev-
enue base of the enterprise to which the money was loaned, or which
was the intended benefactor of the loan.
The World Bank and the IDB interpreted project lending in an elas-
tic way, encompassing, not only physical construction, but "global
loans," as well . 8 This latter type of lending typically involved a loan by
the World Bank or the IDB to an intermediary financial institution
which then loaned the resources to the final users, for example, small
industrial or agricultural enterprises. 9 Global loans enabled the MFAs
to reach smaller enterprises in the developing countries which they oth-
erwise would not have been able to reach if the MFAs attempted to
loan directly to such enterprises.60
The World Bank introduced structural adjustment lending in 1980 in
response to the acute balance of payments crisis in the late 1970s in
many of its borrowing member countries."1 The legal basis for struc-
tural adjustment lending is the "special circumstances" exception pro-
56. See EDWARD S. MASON & ROBERT E. ASHER, THE WORLD BANK SINCE
BRETTON WOODS, 229-259 (1973) (discussing the World Bank's commitment to
"projects" and how project selection and project appraisals work). See also RICHARD
E. FEINBERG, BETWEEN Two WORLDS: THE WORLD BANK'S NExT DECADE 6 (1986)
(stating that before 1980, project lending was the traditional lending approach of the
World Bank).
57. See Baum, supra note 4, at 211 (explaining that the World Bank is closely
engaged in all cycles of lending, from the identification and preparation of projects on
one side to appraisal and supervision on the other). This form of project lending was
not, however, characteristic of the lending of the IMF. Id. The IMF was charged with
monitoring loans, and providing assistance to correct a country's short term balance of
payments disequilibrium, if required. Id. The funds it loaned, consequently, were not
project or program-related like those of the World Bank. Id.
58. See Feinberg, supra note 56, at 5 (describing the World Bank coordinating
global capital flows, and pulling together various lenders and investors in support of
programs primarily in the more debt-ridden countries).
59. See MASON & ASHER, supra note 56, at 359 (stating that loans were processed
through finance companies which were guaranteed by governments, and the finance
companies channeled the funds to the targeted enterprise).
60. See MASON & ASHER, supra note 56. at 362 (describing the success of develop-
ment finance companies cooperating with the World Bank in channeling investments
and entrepreneurship into financially viable enterprises).
61. See SHIHATA, CHANGING WORLD, supra note 5, at 26-27 (describing the intro-
duction of structural adjustment loans in 1980 when the World Bank realized that
certain countries faced severe balance of payments deficits; and, as a result, economic
reconstruction became a precondition for the sound financing of new investment).
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vided in the World Bank's Articles of Agreement.62 Although Article
III provides a clear preference for project lending, the term "special
circumstances" is not defined in the Articles and, thus, emerged as a
flexible concept over the years. As a result of the World Bank's reliance
on this concept, the World Bank invaded the "jurisdiction" of the IMF,
engaging the borrowing country in a macroeconomic dialogue, which in
many cases duplicates the same dialogue as the IMF.
More importantly, structural adjustment lending led to a rough divi-
sion of labor between the two institutions resulting in the IMF handling
the macroeconomic negotiations whereas the World Bank engages in
sector negotiations.6 3 In the last few years, sector adjustment lending,
which focuses on sectorial investment programs, policies, and institu-
tions as an essential factor of supply response, emerged as the domi-
nant adjustment lending practice.64 Sectorial lending reflects the World
Bank's view that the policy environment is at least as important as cre-
ating the physical and institutional framework for growth and
development.65
The distinguishing characteristic of sector adjustment lending is that
the disbursement of loan funds are tied to policy commitments of the
borrower, rather than to a specific construction schedule of physical
works or applications for funding by industrial or agricultural enter-
prises.66 The loan funds are disbursed in "tranches," the first usually
distributed upon signature of the loan agreement and fulfillment of le-
gal conditions precedent.6 7 The remaining loan funds are then dis-
bursed in subsequent tranches after a review, or reviews depending
upon how many tranches are involved, to determine whether the bor-
62. World Bank Memorandum, supra note 17, at 11.
63. See Stephen A. Silard, The Role of the International Monetary Fund, 32 Am.
U. L. REV. 89, 100-102 (1982) (discussing the relationship between the IMF and the
World Bank). The IMF monitors exchange arrangements, and supports a comprehen-
sive economic policy framework. Id. For the World Bank, project lending is still an
integral part of its operations. Id.
64. World Bank Memorandum, supra note 17, at 8. See Gerald K. Hellziner, Pol-
icy-Based Program Lending: A Look at the Bank's New Role, in BETWEEN Two
WORLD: THE WORLD BANK'S NEXT DECADE, 47, 49-52 (Richard E. Feinberg & con-
tributors eds., 1986) (describing how sector adjustment loans have become more impor-
tant in the last two years). The distinction between structural adjustment loans and
sector adjustment loans is also delineated. Id.
65. World Bank Memorandum, supra note 17, at 8.
66. See Silard, supra note 63, at 84-88 (explaining that the members' policies must
be satisfactory such that the members deserve the Funds support and may receive IMF
Funds).
67. See Silard, supra note 63, at 84-98 (elaborating on how the IMF makes its
resources available to members under a process called the "stand-by" arrangement).




rower fulfilled the commitments made initially in order to obtain the
loan. 8
Sector lending presents a great advantage from the borrower's view-
point. The disbursed funds may be used for virtually any purpose, ex-
clusive of the designated prohibited purposes. For example, a finance
minister who receives a sector loan enjoys great discretion using the
loan funds, in contrast to a project loan, which is restricted to the pro-
ject or program for which it was borrowed. The borrower obtains an
immediate disbursement upon signature of the loan contract and, in
subsequent tranches, upon complying with the policy commitments
agreed upon as a condition of the loan. 8 Yet, the borrower must repay
the sector loan on a more accelerated schedule than a conventional pro-
ject loan, because such loans are disbursed much more rapidly than
project loans, which results in a shorter period of time for repayment of
the loan.70
Under this system, it is impossible to determine whether the bor-
rower is complying with its policy commitments in order to obtain the
loan, or if the borrower would have effected policy reforms absent the
loan. As a result, the country is, in effect, receiving a reward for doing
that which it ought to have done and what it probably would have done
in its own best interest without receiving the loan. If this is the case,
then the borrower has not added to its productive capacity. If this is
not the case, and the borrower was induced to undertake the policy
reforms by the temptation of external financing, rather than by convic-
tion, the reforms probably will not last very long.
The Agreement establishing the IDB limits the IDB to "principally"
financing projects." Unlike other MFAs, the borrowing member coun-
tries of the IDB own a majority of the share of capital in the Institu-
tion itself.72 By voting together, a limited group of the members, which
are shareholders in the Institution, could theoretically approve loans
and technical assistance operations without the consent of the other
shareholders. The IDB, however, operates on the basis of consensus,7 3
68. Silard, supra note 63, at 95. The purchase in installments is subject to perform-
ance criteria that may include review clauses on specific policies. Id.
69. INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 15 (1991)
[hereinafter 1990 IDB Report] (explaining that sector lending permits the IDB to pro-
vide quick disbursement of loans to offset the adverse affects which often follow policy
reform). These loans may be used to finance imports. Id.
70. Id.
71. Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank, Apr. 8, 1959,
10 U.S.T. 3029, 389 U.N.T.S. 69, art. II, § 7 (a) (vi) [hereinafter 1DB Agreement).
72. Id., art. II, § 3 (a).
73. Id., art. IV, § 9 (stating that all the decisions in the IDB's Fund requires a two-
thirds majority).
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and, as a result, controversial questions are postponed until agreement
is reached among the members. The United States and one other coun-
try with a designated percentage of the voting power of the share own-
ership could effectively delay consideration of an operation74 by the
Board of Executive Directors of the IDB (which must approve all loan
or technical assistance proposals for financing) for up to one year.
The replenishment negotiations at Amsterdam yielded a compromise
resulting in the Replenishment Agreement. 75 The Replenishment
Agreement allows the IDB to engage in sector lending76 and, thus,
launched the IDB into the policy reform game which is central to the
Bretton Woods Institutions. Previously, the IDB concentrated upon
project lending, although sector conditions were often considered part
of the conditions attached to a particular project loan proposal. The
IDB traditionally considered policy reform best left to the political pro-
cess within an individual country. The following example illustrates the
difference between the two loan approaches in considering an electric
power loan. The IDB discusses the tariff policies applied in the sector
with the country authorities to assure that the enterprises are financed
with sufficient revenues to carry out the investment program in the sec-
tor. The decision, however, whether the sector should be largely pri-
vately- or publicly-owned, falls within the realm of political decisions
and, as such, should be left to the country to decide.
By authorizing the IDB to engage in sector lending, the Board of
Governors, the governing authority of the IDB,' 7 in essence, authorizes
74. Latin Americans Call for Early Implementation of Brady Dept Plan, UPI,
Mar. 21, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (noting that because the
United States provides seventy percent (70%) of the IDB's subsidies and has a thirty-
four and five-tenths percent (34.5 %) voting share, the United States sought veto power
on the loans). The United States, however, settled on the ability to delay loan approval
commitments. Id.
75. Inter-American Development Bank Replenishment: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Int'l Econ. Pol'y, Oceans & Env't of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1989) [hereinafter IDB Replenishment Hearings]
(statement of David C. Milford). The IDB in the negotiation of the seventh replenish-
ment of its resources, was given the authority to engage in sector lending. Id.
The agreement on a seventh replenishment of the IDB's resources was reached at
Amsterdam in 1989 after three years of often bitter negotiations between the Latin
American countries and the United States Treasury. Id. The major issue revolved
around the United States Treasury's demand for an effective veto by the United States
and Canada over the operations of the IDB. Id.
76. See id. at 7 (observing that sector lending is new to the IDB, and that it is
provided that the first two years of lending is cofinanced with the World Bank).
77. IDB Agreement, art. VIII, § 2. The IDB operates on a four-year funding cycle.
A lending program and the necessary capital increase required to sustain the lending
gain approval from the Board of Governors of the Institution. Id. The Board of Gover-
nors is the highest governing body of the IDB. Id. Governors are usually Ministers of
[VOL. 8:39
FINANCING: ACCOUNTABILITY
the IDB to enter into a more far-reaching dialogue with borrowing
countries over the shape of their economy.78 Sector lending is limited to
a maximum of twenty-five percent (25 %) of the US 22.5 billion dollars
lending program approved for the four-year period of the Replenish-
ment.79 The IDB has attempted to design sector adjustment loans so
that they have an investment component, as well as a fast disbursing
aspect linked only to policy reform commitments.
In 1990, the IDB approved six sector loans to five countries totaling
US 1.3 billion dollars.8 0 This constituted thirty-five percent (35%) of
the lending for the year."' As a result of sector lending, the IDB was in
a position to assist in the improvement of financial and economic re-
forms in the public sector; to support efforts by the countries involved
to privatize state-owned enterprises; and to promote private sector in-
volvement in the economy.82 Precisely how the Bank must accomplish
these ends is difficult to ascertain from the public documentation. The
1990 Annual Report, which is much more informative than previous
reports, observes that the World Bank approved its adjustment loan to
help Mexico finance policy reform in telecommunications and transpor-
tation.83 In part, the loan is to assist in the privatization of TELMEX,
the Mexican telecommunication company, and to develop a regulatory
system for its promotion and administration. The IDB also provides
funds aimed at making the trucking industry more competitive, and
able to meet the particular needs of long distance freight hauling, the
principal means by which goods are transported in Mexico.8'
The World Bank approved two sector loans for Venezuela. One loan
was for modernizing the financial sector reforms.80 The other loan was
Finance or Economy, or Presidents of Central Banks of the countries which are the
shareholders of the IDB. The Board of Governors meets annually and must formally
approve the financial statements of the Institution. Id. Only the Board of Directors can
approve an increase in the share of capital which is necessary to sustain a lending
program. Id.
78. 1990 IDB Report, supra note 69, at 15. The 1990 Annual Report explains that
sector lending assists borrowers in their efforts to focus on the institutional, sector, and
the macroeconomic aspects of the operations which inhibit the efficient use of resources
at the project level. Id. The IDB uses sector loans in order to engage the borrower in
dialogues to address and overcome the principle economic, financial, and institutional
hindrances to development. Id.
79. IDB Replenishment Hearings, supra note 75, at 4.
80. 1990 IDB Report, supra note 69, at 15.
81. 1990 IDB Report, supra note 69, at 15.
82. 1990 IDB Report, supra note 69, at 11.
83. 1990 IDB Report, supra note 69, at 15.
84. 1990 IDB Report, supra note 69, at 15.
85. 1990 IDB Report, supra note 69, at 109-10.
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for public enterprise reforms.8 6 The financial sector loans included pol-
icy actions such as: improving credit allocation, reducing the public
sector's role in financial institutions, and establishing a stronger regula-
tory framework to better supervise private banks. 87 The public enter-
prise loan established an innovative program privatizing many public
corporations, and establishing stricter operating rules for institutions
remaining in the public sector.88
The World Bank also approved two sector adjustment loans to help
approve agricultural sector reforms in Honduras and Jamaica. The
Honduras loan emphasized reform to the general policy environment,
especially with respect to international trade.8 9 The Jamaica loan em-
phasized agricultural pricing policies, agricultural credits, including in-
terest rate policy; domestic marketing of commodities; privatization of
publicly-owned lands; and chemical pesticides control.90
Sector loans are clearly focused on policy reform. The Annual Re-
port, however, scarcely addresses the use of the loan funds, including:
whether the funds are used directly for investment purposes; whether
the funds disbursed are used for general imports unrelated to the sector
in which the reforms are to be carried out; or, whether it is possible to
tell precisely what commitments the particular government, or its exe-
cuting entities (such as, TELMEX, the financial institutions in Vene-
zuela, and the agricultural institutions in Honduras and in Jamaica),
gave as a condition to first and second tranches of disbursement of the
loan funds. For example, it is not evident from the Annual Report that
the agricultural sector loan in Jamaica was delayed for a substantial
period of time because of a bitter dispute with authorities of the Jamai-
can government over the speed at which interest rates were to be raised
for farmers with small holdings. 1 Another example which is not evi-
dent in the Annual Report involves Honduras. A principal issue in
86. 1990 IDB Report, supra note 69, at 110-11.
87. 1990 IDB Report, supra note 69, at 109-10.
88. 1990 IDB Report, supra note 69, at 109-10.
89. 1990 IDB Report, supra note 69, at 86-88.
90. 1990 IDB Report, supra note 69, at 89-91.
91. See Jamaica: Caribbean Support in Flight Against Interest Rate Hike, King-
ston, INTER-AMERICAN PRESS SERVICE, June 8, 1990 (reporting on the dissatisfaction
of farmers concerning conversion to a market driven interest rate). In Jamaica, fixed
interest rates were replaced by a market driven system of interest rates. 1990 IDB
Report, supra note 69, at 90.
It is an article of faith in the MFAs that interest should not be subsidized for any
segment of the population and should be in excess of the rate of inflation in the coun-
try, i.e., the borrowers should be charged a "real" rate of interest.
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Honduras was the revision of the agrarian reform law to permit the
sale and transfer of title to agrarian reform properties. 2
Both issues involved major questions of social policy for the borrow-
ing countries. The social policy in the case of Jamaica was the promo-
tion of family-size holdings, both as a means of slowing down migration
to the large urban center of Kingston, and as a means of promoting
domestic food production. 3 The social policy in the case of Honduras
was the limitation on sale property obtained as a result of an agrarian
reform proceeding in order to prevent the concentration of agricultural
holdings in a few large entities. 4
In both cases, economic efficiencies were possibly sacrificed for the
purpose of achieving social stability in rural areas. Who, however, de-
cides the proper balance among these considerations? Further, should it
be the MFAs or the government concerned? As a corollary, would the
United States have created a rural life with all the amenities which are
taken for granted in the United States without subsidized credit for
rural electrification and, as in the American West, subsidized water
rates?
Reasonable people differ over the proper mix of the various policies.
There is, however, no way of knowing from public documentation
whether the MFAs have been "reasonable" in the negotiations. In all
four cases presented herein, the IDB sector loans were made in con-
junction with the World Bank. It may not be coincidental that the most
contentious issues appear to have arisen in the context of negotiations
with small countries whereas in the case of the large countries, such as
Mexico and Venezuela, the sector loans appear to be more designed to
reward past performance. Apparently, the MFAs have more "leverage"
with the smaller countries.
V. THE POLITICAL QUESTION
The Articles of Agreement of the IBRD explicitly prohibit the
World Bank and its officers from taking into account the "political
character" of the member or members during the decision-making pro-
92. Honduras; Politics & Economy, Callejas draws on Solid Experience; 'Tailor-
Made' Cabinet of Businessmen and Technocrats, LATIN AMERICA REGIONAL REPORTS,
Feb. 22, 1990, at 6; Juan Ramon Duran, Peasants Seize State Offices to Demand
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cess. 95 The IBRD must also ensure that the proceeds of any loan are
used "for [the] purposes for which the loan was granted, with due at-
tention to considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard
to political or other noneconomic influences or considerations." ' The
IBRD is clearly and unequivocally prohibited from making or denying
loans based upon the political complexion of the borrowing member
country.
The Articles of the IBRD go still further. On the face of the Arti-
cles, "noneconomical factors" are prohibited from being taken into ac-
count in, for example, determining a lending program in a particular
country.97 Read literally, the IBRD cannot, in conformance with its
own Articles of Agreement, assess a country's "performance" in terms
of its human rights record. No matter how atrocious that record may
be, it is irrelevant to the decisions of the IBRD pursuant to its own
charter provisions.
The IDB Charter is similar to the Articles of Foundation of the
IBRD. It provides that: "[t]he Bank, its officers and employees shall
not interfere in the political affairs of any member, nor shall they be
influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or
members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to
their decisions."
98
These explicit prohibitions should not be taken too seriously with re-
spect to the actions of the United States Government. The United
States Government respects these provisions of the governing docu-
ments of both institutions on a highly sensitive basis. Instances in
which a government's economic policies conformed to the prevailing ec-
onomic orthodoxy, for example, in the case of Chile under the leader-
ship of Pinochet and South Korea under its military dictatorship, Char-
ter provisions of the IDB prohibiting political considerations were
invoked as the justification for the United States Executive Director
voting in favor of loans for these two (not to mention other similar
type) governments. 9  However, in other instances in which a govern-
ment has been politically obnoxious to the United States Government,
95. Articles of Agreement International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, art. IV, § 10, 60 Stat. 1440, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134 (1945) [herein-
after IBRD Agreement].
96. Id., art. III, § 5(b).
97. Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard
U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1162, 1218 n.231 (1987).
98. IDB Agreement, supra note 71, art. III, § 5(f).
99. Ignored Again: Human Rights in Chile, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1986, § A, at
18. But see International Financial Institutions Act, § 701 (requiring the United States
to oppose loans to countries that abuse human rights).
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as in the case of the Allende Government in Chile in the early 1970s
and the Sandinista Regime in Nicaragua, 100 United States Government
officials made it clear that continued lending to these governments
would have dire consequences for the lending institutions.
In the IDB, the United States is the largest single shareholder.', No
increase in resources is possible without the participation of the United
States. Not surprisingly, the IDB has conformed its lending program to
this political injunction. The injunction is communicated confidentially
at a high level. The basis for denying a loan is never acknowledged as a
result of the disapproval of the United States Government for the po-
tential borrowing country. "Economic" considerations are invariably
cited for the denial of a loan; yet within the organization, it is under-
stood by virtually all that the country in question is being cast into
conventry for purely political reasons, in flagrant violation of the Char-
ter of the IDB.
The conspiracy of silence is maintained by all concerned. The highest
ranking officials think they have no alternative except to conform to the
desires of the United States so as not to jeopardize the viability of the
Institution, itself. The other borrowing countries fear losing access to
one of the few sources of long-term capital for development purposes.
Often politically conservative themselves, the officials are not enthusias-
tic about supporting a "leftist" regime (like the Allende Government in
Chile) or a "revolutionary" regime (as in Nicaragua), with influences
which might elicit similar movements in their own countries. Also in-
stances involving non-borrowing countries, at least with respect to
Latin America, result in a strong tendency to defer to the "national
security" interests of the United States.
Hence, the sanctity of the Charters of the MFAs is, as far as the
United States and the Institutions are concerned-"a sometime thing."
It is also true, however, that it would be anomalous for the MFAs to
advise a country that its "performance" does not justify a major lend-
ing program because of consistent and horrendous violations (for exam-
ple, in the cases of Guatemala and El Salvador) of the rule of law,
understood as the abuse of the human person, when, in doing so, the
MFAs would be violating their own "law," through violation of their
own governing documents.
In order to avoid this anomaly, the World Bank has attempted to
develop a concept of "governance." This concept seeks to encourage the
development and use of effective executing programs as necessary com-
100. Ignored Again, supra note 99, at 18.
101. End of an Era, supra note 19, at 1.
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ponents of economic development plans.10 2 Corruption, however, is an
impediment to the effective execution of an agreed upon economic pro-
gram and it is, therefore, a legitimate criterion for evaluating a coun-
try's "economic performance."
The IBRD has extended the dialogue with the borrowing country
beyond the traditional macroeconomic issues with which it has tradi-
tionally dealt. There are, however, definite limitations on how far "gov-
ernance" can take the IBRD in its dialogue with the borrowing country
and in its internal deliberations with respect to whether a lending pro-
gram is warranted. The application of the rule of law must be shown to
have some relevance to the efficiency of the economy. In order to re-
duce the costs of economic transactions, for example, the IBRD pro-
vides assistance with modernizing and increasing the efficiency of the
borrowing country's judicial system. Similarly, the IBRD suggests im-
proved methods of enforcing laws that have a clear relation to eco-
nomic development, such as methods of tax collection. The IBRD
might also recommend changes to current laws, such as those gov-
erning financial institutions, in order to permit foreclosures on debt and
mortgages, for example. 103 Faithful to the terms of the Articles of
Agreement, the Bank has explicitly rejected taking into account "politi-
cal" or "human rights" concerns in assessing the eligibility of a country
for a major lending program with the Bank.""
This legally correct view is increasingly at variance with the consen-
sus which is apparently developing within the international community.
That consensus has found an institutional expression in the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The Preamble to
the Charter of the EBRD commits the Bank to act in accordance with
the "fundamental principles of multiparty democracy, the rule of law,
102. See Governance Paper, supra note 23, at 13 (discussing the role of the IBRD
in "governing" the implementation of development programs by "creating and sus-
taining an enabling environment for development"). This paper was originally desig-
nated "For Official Use Only." The author has chosen to ignore this limitation; one of
the more unfortunate aspects of the MFAs is the tendency to limit public discussion of
controversial issues which directly affect their operations. The author believes that a
government which submits information it considers confidential to an MFA as part of
the negotiation of a loan proposal or assessment of economic performance is entitled to
have that confidentiality respected. But the attempt to limit public consideration of a
general issue such as governance, which affects no specific operation or government
confidentiality, should not be entitled to the same presumption.
103. Governance Paper, supra note 23, at 13.
104. See World Bank Memorandum, supra note 3, at 35-36 (stating that the prac-
tice of the IBRD to date has been not to consider the degree of respect afforded to
political, as opposed to economic, rights by a government as a factor in the decision to
make or not to make loans to that government).
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respect for human rights and market economics." 0 5 This commitment
is made even more explicit in Articles 1 and 2, which delineate the
purposes and functions of the Institution.' 6 The EBRD Charter is a
radical departure from the neutral stance taken on political and human
rights issues in the Charters of the IBRD and the IDB.107
Why should there be a different standard for the non-borrowing
countries of the IBRD and the IDB than there is for borrowing coun-
tries of Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union?
Every country in Latin America, with the exception of Haiti and Cuba,
now nominally adheres to a commitment to multiparty democracy and
human rights. Therefore, it is currently an opportune time to conse-
crate this commitment by amending the Charters of these Institutions
along the same lines as the Charter of the EBRD. Not taking such
action implies doubts as to the durability of the commitment to mul-
tiparty democracy and human rights in the region. There is no conceiv-
able reason why this commitment to multiparty democracy and human
rights is only applicable to Eastern Europe and Latin America.
It is true that amending the Charters of the MFAs may open the
door to other amendments, particularly with respect to the sharehold-
ings of the member states and their respective voting power. This could
lead to a realignment of power in these Institutions; and this would not
necessarily be a bad thing. A realignment of voting shares to reflect the
reality of the redistribution of economic power in the world, from that
prevailing when the Charters of these Institutions were originally
drafted and approved, is long overdue.
It is true that the concepts of multiparty political democracy and
human rights are not, in practice, self-evident. Guatemala, for example,
has multiparty elections; yet it also has one of the most brutal military
establishments in the world, which is not susceptible to civilian con-
trol.10 The military is historically aligned with important sectors of the
105. Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, May 29, 1990, Preamble, 29 I.L.M. 1077, 1083 (1990) [hereinafter EBRD
Agreement].
106. Id. arts. I & 2, 29 I.L.M. at 1084.
107. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes and
functions of both the IBRD and the IDB).
108. See Richard L. Millet, Limited Hopes and Fears in Guatemala, CURRENT
HISTORY, Mar. 1991, at 125 (noting that twenty political parties and eleven presiden-
tial candidates took part in the most recent election in Guatemala): see also Yes. Gen-
eral After You, General, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 12-18, 1991, at 37-38 (explaining that
the popularly elected president is really subordinate to the military and acknowledging
the human rights atrocities that occur in Guatemala due to a lack of control over the
armed forces); Where the War Still Looks Cold, THE EcoNo,1asT, Feb. 8-14, 1992, at
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property and commercial establishments."0 9 The issue, therefore, is
whether multiparty democracy is truly meaningful in Guatemala in the
face of the military's systemic abuse of human rights? In an instance in
which economic inequity is so deeply entrenched, does multiparty polit-
ical democracy become like a mantra substituted for action to change
for the better the condition of life of the great majorities in Guatema-
lan society?
Similar issues and questions can be raised and are relevant with re-
spect to the dominance of the PRI in Mexico, 110 as well as the contin-
ued near feudal conditions which exist in parts of Northeast Brazil.'
The commitment to multiparty political democracy and human rights
is, consequently, no panacea for the deep social and economic divisions
which characterize so much of Latin American society. Paradoxically,
the elimination of such chasms in the formerly communist states of
Eastern Europe may have made the achievement of multiparty political
democracy in these countries more feasible than in many parts of Latin
America, provided, of course, that those countries can overcome the
corrosive effects of "murderous" nationalism which emerged in the af-
termath of the fall of the communist regimes that had governed in
Eastern Europe.
The primacy of such issues and questions is the "Achilles heel" of
the Latin American democracies. In spite of the above caveats, it re-
mains true that making explicit the commitments to political mul-
tiparty democracy, human rights, and social equity in the definition of
"country performance" could force a more balanced approach than
now exists within the MFAs with respect to who has access to the re-
sources of these Institutions.
Under such an enlarged concept, neither Chile under the leadership
of General Pinochet nor South Korea under the military dictatorship,
could have been considered the "stars" of the system. There might be a
less uncritical approach to the Mexican "performance," and Guate-
37 (reasserting that although the 1990 elections mark the longest period of civilian rule
in Guatemala since 1954, the military is really in control of the country).
109. See Millet, supra note 108, at 128 (noting the support of certain right-wing,
private sector interests for the military leadership).
110. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, USA, REPORT 1992: A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT
ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AROUND THE WORLD 186-88 (1992) (establishing the
long term political success of the PRI in Mexico, but also acknowledging the wide-
spread occurrence of serious human rights violations by agents of the government).
I 11. See, e.g., id. at 71-72 (detailing the oppressive conditions suffered by peasants
and peasant rights' activists in northeastern Brazil and the lack of governmental re-
sponse to the numerous human rights violations that have occurred in those areas).
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mala might not qualify for assistance without fundamental reforms in
the military and land tenure in the rural areas.
VI. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON "ACCOUNTABILITY"
It is not true, as some have alleged, that the MFAs are accountable
to no one except themselves. There is a highly structured hierarchy of
accountability. The staff is accountable to the Board of Executive Di-
rectors of the Institutions. 112 The Executive Directors are accountable,
as is the staff, to the Governors who are the political level of decision
making for the MFAs.113 The Governors are accountable to the United
States Congress and the Parliaments, which must ultimately approve
an increase in resources for the MFAs.
1 4
There are important limits to this structure of accountability. The
staff, the Directors and the Governors are largely drawn from similar
backgrounds of economics and finance. The concept of development
within the organizations is a highly constricted one. It has evolved
somewhat to finally recognize the urgency as a social dimension to a
short term structural adjustment program. But "country performance,"
which is the precondition for a major lending program remains largely
a dialogue on the traditional macroeconomic conditions, now enlarged
to encompass privatization of state-owned enterprises and market liber-
alization, particularly financial market reform.
The subject matter of the negotiations is largely impenetrable to
those outside of the Institutions and to the United States Treasury and
its counterparts in other non-borrowing countries. To a significant ex-
112. See, e.g., IDB Agreement, supra note 71, art. VIII, § 5 (outlining the respon-
sibilities of the president, vice-president(s) and staff of the IDB. all of whom report to
the Board of Executive Director(s); IBRD Agreement, supra note 3, art. V. § 5 (stat-
ing the authority of the Board of Executive Directors over the president, vice-presi-
dent(s) and general staff of the World Bank).
113. See, e.g., IDB Agreement, supra note 71, art. VIII, § 2(a)-(c) (providing the
Board of Governors with the authority over the Board of Executive Directors, to whom
the Governors may delegate certain powers of the IDB); IBRD Agreement, supra note
3, art. V, § 2(a) (creating the Board of Governors as the ultimate authority over the
operations of the World Bank).
114. See Ibrahim Shihata, The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of
the Legal Issues and the Record of Achievements, 17 DENv. J. I.'T't L. & POL'y 39,
45-47 (1988) (admitting that although officials of the World Bank are charged with
serving the interests of the World Bank first and foremost, in certain situations, the
World Bank officers are able to vote the political will of the countries they represent);
see Shihata, Changing World, supra note 5, at 14 (recognizing that the future suc-
cesses of the World Bank depend upon the support it receives from its member coun-
tries); see also IDB Agreement, supra note 71, art. IX, § I (asserting the rights of the
member countries to withdraw support from the IDB); IBRD Agreement, supra note 3,
art VI, § I (allowing member countries to withdraw from the World Bank).
1992]
AM. U.J. INTL L. & POL'Y
tent, it must remain this way. A sector adjustment loan or the IMF
Extended Fund Facility cannot be negotiated in a "fishbowl." The sub-
ject matter and the data are too sensitive for the negotiating govern-
ment. The people affected are usually too amorphous a group, making
it difficult for a whole society or a sector of society (e. g., the agricul-
tural sector), to be organized to express an homogenous point of view.
That is why a specific project which affects a defined population or
area, particularly where physical structures are identifiable (as with a
dam or a road), is much more susceptible to being evaluated by people
and institutions such as NGOs which have an interest in the area af-
fected by the proposed project. The issue of "accountability" now
seems, to a very significant extent, to revolve around projects and pro-
grams that affect the physical environment. NGOs in the non-borrow-
ing countries can make common cause with counterparts, however
fledgling, in the borrowing country and population directly impacted.
In the end, the MFAs must be accountable for their programs to
their political "paymasters", specifically the United States Congress
and the Parliaments. It is only these governmental institutions which
can finally approve an amendment of the Charters to incorporate the
political and social values which are rightly expressed through a coun-
try's political system. As long as the legislative authority is satisfied
with the limited approach to development reflected in the current prac-
tices in the MFAs, that constricted approach will continue to prevail.
United States legislation already reflects a mandate that the "voice
and vote" in the MFAs of the respective United States Executive Di-
rectors must oppose loans to countries which are guilty of consistent
and gross human rights violations. 1 5 But this legislation is a unilateral
expression by the United States Congress. It does not become institu-
tionalized as part of the culture of the Institution. Indeed, within the
present constraints of the Charters of these Institutions, with the excep-
tion of the EBRD, it cannot find an institutional expression.
The business of the MFAs has never been economic development; it
is and always has been the political economy of development. The
MFAs have never had to confront the full implications of their actions
within a society. They could, for example, disclaim any responsibility
for the human rights abuses of the Pinochet government, although the
continued lending by these Institutions gave that government a patina
of respectability behind the facade of "outstanding" economic
performance.
115. International Financial Institutions Act of 1977, § 701, 22 U.S.C. 262(d)
(1990).
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It is therefore right and proper that the values which ought to be
reflected in the operations of these Institutions should be incorporated
in an amendment to the Charters of these Institutions, actions which
require the explicit approval of Congress and Parliaments, the ultimate
expression of political accountability.
